# The success of GSM

#### **Ewan Sutherland**

http://www.3wan.net/






### Contents

- Introduction
- What is a success? (or failure)
- Mobile Termination Rates
- Mobile Number Portability
- What happened to 2.5G?
- Other countries, other ways
- Issues


#### Measures of success

- Numbers of customers
- Teledensity
- Growth
- Revenues
- Minutes of voice traffic
- Terabytes of data traffic
- € billions of value added services
- Policy and business lessons for 3G + 4G


### Growth of GSM in the EU-15



### Mobile penetration rates in EU



#### Incumbents on mobile markets



## Is the success replicable?

- TETRA failed
  - digital Private Mobile Radio (PMR)
  - killed by GSM
- ERMES failed
  - digital, bi-directional paging
  - pan-EU spectrum
  - killed by GSM
- PCS failed
  - absorbed into GSM
  - 1800 MHz personal communications system

- GPRS failed?
  - ISDN for mobiles
- UMTS ?
  - Games, Gambling and Girls
- Mobile TV ?
  - a dozen different solutions
  - MNOs and broadcasters both want to control this

#### The economics of success

- Telecommunications market:
  - increased competition
  - operator productivity gains
  - increased employment
- Downstream business activity:
  - productivity gains
  - new services and products
- Upstream business activity:
  - design and manufacturing jobs
  - development of Value Added Services

### User complaints

- High call charges, especially on pre-paid
- Extremely complex tariff plans
- High fixed-to-mobile rates
- High rates for SMS
- Lock-in through handset "subsidies"
- Exorbitant international roaming charges
- High prices for data services
- Poor customer care

The underlying cause is the lack of competition.

### Collusion


- France:
  - Yalta agreement amongst operators




http://www.cartelmobile.org/

- fined €483,000,000 by NCA
- Greece:
  - operators raised SMS prices
    - same day
    - same amount
  - fined by EETT €1,200,000 each

### Mobile market shares



### Herfindahl-Hirschman Index



## Mergers and acquisitions

- During the dot.com boom:
  - bought with shares, not cash
- Paused with dot.bomb
- Began again:
  - Telefónica de España (Latin America and O<sub>2</sub>)
  - Vodafone in Eastern Europe
- Has taken years to integrate businesses
- Some use of trans-national brands
- No trans-national customer offers

### Mobile network operators


- Politico-regulatory gamesmanship:
  - high-power lobbying
  - systematic appeals against decisions
- 3D strategy:
  - Deny
  - Delay
  - Degrade

The original plan was for incumbent operators to learn about competition from mobile markets. Instead, there is convergence of tactics.

## Churn is good (to an extent)

- The ability to switch supplier is a sign of a properly functioning market
- Customers should be able freely to move between suppliers
- However, high churn rates indicate:
  - poor quality of service
  - inadequate customer care
  - excessive prices
- Combined with high customer acquisition costs, high churn rates make the mobile sector very inefficient
- Operators try to lock customers in with:
  - handset "subsidies"
  - network specific handset designs
  - tariff schemes
- These invite interventions by NRAs and NCAs
- MNP does not cause churn, it merely frees customers to churn


## MNP in Hong Kong, SAR



### European Union – MNP

- Some countries have had MNP for a long time
- EU legal obligation since 25 July 2003:
  - geographic numbers
  - non-geographic numbers
- Technology neutral
  - MNP applies to 2G and 3G
- Portability between fixed and mobile:
  - Denmark and Switzerland had legal provisions, but extensively delayed
  - one major problem is high mobile termination rates
  - will never be applied

### Mobile numbers ported in the EU




www.3wan.net 28.viii.06, Skagen 18

#### Mobile termination rates

- A saga over many years
- Operators were originally assumed to be competitive, so allowed to set their own prices
- Long arguments over the need for regulation
- Painful regulatory processes of mind-numbing complexity
- Prices are still far above cost
- Regulatory action will be required for years
- Only just been extended to SMS prices

### Snapshot of MTRs January 2006



Source: IRG.

## Subsidiarity

- Member states were each to implement rules
- Operators demanded "light touch" regulation
- Some countries were incredibly slow
- A few received infringement proceedings
- "incumbent" mobile operators opposed everything
- Subsidiarity has demonstrably failed!
- There are no signs of an internal market
- Light touch regulation can clearly go wrong!

#### Handsets

- Rapid replacement:
  - fashion accessory
  - youth
- Non-network functions:
  - camera & album
  - purse & credit card
  - diary and alarm clock
  - Digital Audio Player (DAP)
- Many unused features







### 2.5G

- GPRS was to be the bridge to 3G
- Techno-hype but no applications
- Very little data usage, so very small revenues
- No commitments to data speeds, no QoS and no Service Level Agreements
- Some success with RIM Blackberry
- Very few value-added services
- Obvious comparison is with i-mode
- Very little to build on for 3G


#### Monoculture

- GSM (or 3GSM) dominates the economic landscape
- Incredibly bitter rivalry with CDMA
- Competition is between 3GSM operators
- No competition with other business models


### Alternative paths

- Wi-Fi
- WiMAX
- CDMA (e.g., cdma450)
- OFMD
- Digital broadcasting (DxB):
  - Digital Audio Broadcast (DAB)
  - Digital Multimedia Broadcast (DMB)
  - Digital Video Broadcast (DVB)

## Changing geography



## Japan switches to 3G



## Continuing success

- Africa
  - 160 million customers
  - 17 per cent teledensity
- India
  - 100 million customers
- China
  - 400 millions customers

### Conclusions

- GSM was much bigger than expected
- But its success killed other initiatives
- Mistakes were made in designing the markets
- The myth of its success delayed regulation
- Regulation remains piecemeal
- A culture of resistance is entrenched
- Trying to block WiMAX and to control mobile TV
- There is a single market only for manufacturers
  - not for operators
  - not for customers

#### Issues

- How competitive are these markets?
- Where are the real bottlenecks?
- What lessons should have been learned by policy makers?
- What can be done to remedy the errors of the past?
- What can be done to stimulate value added services? (mobile or converged)

## Thank you

**Ewan Sutherland** 

http://3wan.net/

3wan [@] 3wan.net

+44 141 416 0666

skype://sutherla

